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rule of caveat emptor will now be ignored in this field. On the contrary,
the court expressly limits the application of the rule to misrepresentations of the sort therein involved, that is, false statements of previous
price offers. "The law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the value and qualities of the articles which they have to sell.
All men know this and a buyer has no right to rely on such statements."'"
The Kabatcbnick decision seems to mean only that misrepresentations
of a prior offer by a seller to a purchaser are now classified as statements
of fact rather than of value.
CONTRACTS-PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS
UNREASONABLY RESTRICTING COMPETITION
Defendant sold his wholesale fruit and vegetable business, including
good will, and leased the premises. The sales contract provided that
defendant "was forever barred and prevented from engaging in any
kind of business" in the county where the business was conducted.
Claiming that the restriction was too broad and was an unreasonable
restraint on trade, defendant re-entered the fruit and vegetable business
and was met by an injunction. The court held that though the restrictive
agreement was unreasonable and the terms thereof indicated no line of
division, the agreement would be enforced only as to a reasonable amount
of time and area. It was decided that defendant could not engage in
the fruit and vegetable business in the county for a period of ten
years, the duration of the lease. Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W. 2d 359
(Ky., 1951).
Any agreement is in restraint of trade when its performance would
limit competition in any business.' Under the early common law, all
such agreements were void because they were considered to be against
public policy.' After a few centuries, English courts upheld agreements
in partial restraint of trade when they were incidental to a sale of
property or a business.3 Today, American jurisdictions hold that contracts not to compete are enforceable if they are ancillary to the sale
of a business and are reasonably limited as to time and area. 4 They are
also in agreement that if a promise is a reasonable restraint of trade, it
will be enforced unless it is part of a plan which tends to create a
monopoly. 5
10 Kimball v. Bank, 144 Mass. 321, 324, 11 N.E. 113, 114 (1887).

1Rest., Contracts § 513 (1932).
26 R.C.L. 785 (1929).
3Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596 (1620); 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 244, 245 (1928),
4
Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. 2d 161 (1948); Rest., Contracts S 515 (1932).
5Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A. 2d 64 (1942); 5 Williston,

Contracts S1659 (rev. ed., 1937).
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When agreements not to compete are found to be unreasonable, the
courts are in disagreement as to whether such restraints must be held
completely void or may still be enforced in part. 6
Where the contract contains both valid and invalid restraints, the
courts will decree enforcement of the valid parts of the contract, provided they are separable in their terms from the invalid.7 This rule has
been applied in those agreements where excessive limitations were placed
on the area s and the time. 9 Many cases can be found wherein the courts
state that the divisibility of contracts depends upon the intention of
the parties and the surrounding circumstances. 10 However, most courts,
while stating the above rule, follow the procedure of merely examining
the contract to see if there are any disjunctive words; if there are none,
they hold the whole covenant indivisible and unenforceable. Illinois
also follows this easy, but often unjustifiable, method." Illinois courts
state that where a contract contains but a single territorial covenant
which is void because it unreasonably restrains trade, the entire contract
must fall.

12

The majority of American jurisdictions follow this method and hold
contrary to the Ceresia case. They hold that if a restrictive covenant
is not divisible by its terms and is unreasonable as to time or area,
partial enforcement thereof would be making a new contract for the
had intended
parties.' 3 The logic of the majority is that if the parties
4
a narrower covenant, they would have agreed to it.'

The Ceresia case represents the modern trend which allows the contract to be enforced to the extent that it is reasonable although the contract is not divisible. 15 In a recent treatise on contracts, it is stated:
In the best considered modern cases,.., the court has decreed enforcement
as against a defendant whose breach has occurred within an area in which
6General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Vis. 565, 243 NAV. 469 (1932);
Suesskind v. Wilson, 124 Ohio St. 54, 176 N.E. 889 (1931); 5 Williston, Contracts
§ 1659 (rev. ed., 1937).
7 General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932).
8 Ibid.
9 Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. (U.S.) 64 (1874).
10E.g., Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526, 78 P. 2d 490 (1938); Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
"Parish v. Schartz, 344 Ill. 563, 176 N.E. 757 (1931); Lanzit v. J.W. Sefton
Mfg. Co., 184 Il. 326, 56 N.E. 393 (1900).
32 Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Ill., 1946); Union
Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 111.420, 61 N.E. 1038 (1901).
' 3 Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A. 2d 161 (1948).
14 Ibid.
15 Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. 2d 451 (C.A. 5th, 1930); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935); Fleckenstein Bros. Co.
v. Fleckenstein, 76 N.J.L. 613, 71 Ad. 265 (S. Ct., 1908).
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restriction would clearly be reasonable, even though the terms of the agreement imposed a larger and unreasonable restraint.16
Two outstanding authorities on contracts, Professors Corbin and
Williston, have recognized and approved the modern trend. Williston,
criticizing the majority rule applicable to indivisible covenants, states,
"I have concluded and have so stated in Section 1660 of the Revised
Edition of my treatise on Contracts, that in such a case the unquestionably legal part of the covenant should be enforced.' 7 Corbin states that
divisibility as to the legal and illegal parts of the restrictive covenants
is not the test. The test should be whether partial enforcement is possible without injury to the public and without injustice to the parties
involved. I8
From a study of the cases, it would seem that the logic of the majority
jurisdictions is weak; the modern trend appears to be the more logical
view. Since it is obvious that the basic intent of the parties is to protect
the purchaser's investment, the terms of the contract should be construed so as to effectuate this intention, if fairly possible. Though the
indivisible covenant restricting competition may be unreasonable as
a whole, an equitable result would probably be obtained if the covenantee
were reasonably protected by partial enforcement of the covenant.
This would furnish the covenantee with that which he bargained forreasonable protection from competition from one who would generally
have an undue competitive advantage.
Recognizing the problem in this phase of the law, some state legislatures have attempted a solution by enacting applicable statutes.' 9 These
statutes have been construed to authorize courts to enforce otherwise
unreasonable covenants as to a reasonable amount of time and area.20
The court, in the instant case, by decreeing partial enforcement of
the restrictive covenant, adopted a logical line of reasoning and effected
a more equitable result. The Ceresia case refused to place a distinct
hardship on the purchaser and denied the seller an unjust enrichment;
this is because the purchaser, of course, had paid a valuable consideration
for the agreement which restricted competition. A contrary result might
fraud, but would place
not only be a powerful temptation to commit
2
a premium on bad faith and dishonesty. '
166 Corbin, Contracts S 1390 (1951), at 500.

J. 40 (1949).
Corbin, Contracts § 1390 (1951); Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky.
115, 25 S.W. 2d 62 (1930).
19 Cal. Civ. Code (1941) c. 526, § 1; Ala. Code (1940) tit. 9, 523.
2
OHerrington v. Hackler, 181 Okla. 396, 74 P. 2d 388 (1937); Edwards v. Mullin,
220 Cal. 379, 30 P. 2d 997 (1934).
21 Dissenting opinion, Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 207, 63 A. 2d 161, 166 (1948).
17 23 Conn. Bar
18 6

